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(I) District Judge Charles Hosack, who was not the trial 
judge, errored (sic) in favor of the Respondents on their 
Summary Judgment Motion and entered an Order which is in 
error as a matter of law in that Defendant DORSEY was 
conveyed title by Warranty Deed from WRIGHTS to all of 
Lots 1 and 2 according to the Plat of Steamboat Bay. The 
Warranty Deed, Wright to Dorsey has conveyance language 
as stated, and the "Subject to" language of the Warranty 
Deed is only a limitation on WRIGHTS' warranty(s) of title. 
This is the Warranty deed, Defendants' Exhibit "A" 
(II) The trial judge, District Judge Yerby, made oral [mdings 
of fact and conclusions of law in which he agreed with the 
summary judgment decision of District Judge Hosack, which 
is in error for the same reasons District Judge Hosack was in 
error. 
(III) District Judge Verby erred and disregarded the principal 
of law that in quiet title the issue is that the Plaintiffs 
(Respondents) must prove the sufficiency and strength of 
their own title and cannot assert a weakness of the title of the 
Defendants (Appellants). 
(IV) District Judge Verby erred in ruling that the Plat 
dedicated a common use easement for aU lot owners. Even 
assuming he is correct in that regard, Harker "reserved" 






not acquire any right, title, or interest based on the Plat 
language. 
(V) The District Court erred in fmding that the "use" of 
common beach property was dedicated by the original 
platting party, HARKER, as common easement. The Plat 
itself describes HARKERS' express statement to the 
contrary, that Lot 1 included the land from the north and 
south boundaries of Lot 1 extended to the Lake Bed of Priest 
Lake. In other words, Lot 1 expressly was platted to include 
that the District Judge found to be "common beach". There 
is no wording of common beach, common area, or dedication 
upon the Plat. 
(VI) Assuming for legal analysis that the intention of Harker 
by the Plat did dedicate an easement to use a beach area 
(disputed strip), Harker in the Warranty Deed To Wright 
"reserved" the beach area (disputed strip) to themselves, so it 
is error for the District Judge to rule that the Plaintiffs 
Respondents received any interest in the real estate at issue 
by the doctrine of dedication by the Plat. 
(VII) There was no delivery and no acceptance of any 
supposed dedication of common beach. 
(VIII) The District Judge found dedication based on "totality 
of circumstances and facts" but did not fmd, conclude, or 
articulate what circumstances or facts existed to make such 
finding or conclusion. 
(IX) Upon platting there was no land "lying between the 
mean high water line of Priest Lake and the west boundary of 
Lot 1 owned by DORSEY. The west boundary of Lot 1 is 
platted to be at the same location on the ground as is the 
original 1890 ordinary high water line of Priest Lake. 
District Judge Verby erred in fmding what he described this 
beach area as buffer strip being a parcel of land not lying 
within platted Lot 1. 
(X) Respondents are judicially estopped by their own 
Amended Complaint in which they alleged the area in 
dispute remained owned/vested in the original platting party, 
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HARKERS. Respondents could not be co-owners or co-
tenants of the same parcel. 
(XI) Respondents' Amended Complaint abandoned the 
theory of dedication by the Plat, and dedication by the Plat 
was not pled as grounds for relief. Respondents presented no 
evidence or argument on such issue. The "dedication" of 
Common Beach found by District Judge Yerby was outside 
the scope of the Respondents' grounds for relief. 
(XII) Respondents did not meet the requirements of Idaho 
Code § 5-203 or § 5-205 because they were never seized or 
possessed of the real estate within 5 or 20 years as required 
by law, nor did they bring this action within the time period. 
(XIII) The District Judge erred in not finding that DORSEY 
has the benefit of Idaho Code § 206, as the mvner of legal 
title to Lot 1, they are presumed to be the possessor and the 
Respondents never held or adversely possessed the property 
at issue. The District Court erred in shifting the burden of 
proof on the issue of adverse possession onto DORSEYS 
instead of the Respondents. 
(XIV) The District Court erred in finding the Respondents 
have a use easement appurtenance to all 8 lots. 
Respondents' Restated Issues on Appeal.. ............................. . 
1. Did the Trial Court correctly fmd that the beach in 
front of Lot 1 was excluded from Dorseys' chain of 
title? 
2. Did the Trial Court correctly fmd from the evidence 
that Harkers intended to dedicate the beach in front of 
Lot 1 as a common beach in favor of all eight (8) 
lots? 
3. As a matter of law, can a developer privately dedicate 
land for the benefit of all those members of the sub-
division or plat? 
4 Are the Respondents or Appellants entitled to 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants' Brief seems to be more argument than recitation of facts. For this 
reason, Respondents Ross, et aI., chose to restate the undisputed facts of the case, as 
allowed by I.A.R. 35 (b)(3), as follows: 
A. PROCEDURAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 17, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. F. M. Harker ("Harker") signed an Owner's 
Certification creating a Plat for the Steamboat Bay lots ("the Plat"). (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
10) The Plat consisted of eight (8) lots extending from Priest Lake along a shared 
"private" road, along the south boundary of all eight (8) lots. For convenience, the Plat is 
incorporated herein as Addendum "A". (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10) 
The Plat contains language that reads as follows: 
It is the intent of the owners that Lot 1 and the 20-foot 
private road, as shown on the herein Plat, shall include the 
lands lying between the sidelines produced to the mean-
high-water-line of Priest Lake. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 
Four days later, Harkers conveyed Lot 1 to Appellant Dorseys' direct predecessor 
in interest, R.G. and Nitella Wright, husband and wife, ("Wright"). 
The Harker to Wright deed ("Harker-Wright Deed") describes the real property 
conveyed as follows: 
Lot ONE (1) Steamboat Bay Lots, a platted sub-division of 
Government Lot Five in Section 27, Township 60 North, 
Range 4 West, Boise Meridian. 
It is specifically understood that the grantors reserve, as a 
common beach for all owners in said plat, that certain tract 
and beach lying between the mean high water line and the 
West boundary line of said Lot One. Said reserved beach 
being a tract approximately 20 feet wide between the waters 
of Priest Lake and the West boundaary (sic) of the above 
described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in length. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 
On October 1, 1999, Nitella Wright, a widow, conveyed to Appellants, Tommy A. 
Dorsey and Erin T. Dorsey, husband and wife, ("Dorsey") by Warranty Deed, which reads 
as follows: 
Lots 1 and 2 in STEAMBOAT BAY LOTS, according to the 
plat thereof. ..... 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 
The record is clear that Harker never conveyed the common beach reserved in the 
Harker-Wright deed, to Wrights or Dorseys .. 
The Respondent, Larry Brown, owns Lots 3 and 4, Alan Ross owns Lots 5 and 6, 
and Michael and Nancy Murphy own Lots 7 and 8. (Brown, Ross and Murphy are referred 
to collectively as "Ross, et al.") Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3, 4 and 5. 
Respondents Ross, et. al. filed their Compliant for Quiet Title and Declaratory 
Judgment on May 26, 2009 and an Amended Complaint on September 15, 2010 upon 
discovery that Banner Bank and other lenders may have held a security interest in the 
common beachfront property. (R. Vol. 1. pp.II-22, Vol. II, pp. 192-204) 
Appellants' Brief spends a great deal of time discussing the Harkers' intent on the 
Plat Certificate, but there is little discussion of the reservation of a common beach by 
2 
Harker in the Dorsey chain of title. This issue was resolved in Plaintiffs' favor by 
Summary Judgment on April 28, 2010. (R. Vol. 1. pp 136-8) 
At trial on June 27 and 28,2011, Dorsey's Counsel called Nitella Wright in the 
Defendants' case. Mrs. Wright did little to advance Appellants Dorsey's claim of 
ownership to the beach. When asked by Mr. Finney what she did when she discovered 
that Harkers had reserved the beach in front of Lot 1 for all eight (8) lots, Mrs. Wright 
testified as follows: 
Q. Did you do anything about it? 
A. I think-I don't remember if we talked to Harkers 
nor not. You know it's 45 years ago. You kind of 
can't remember. I don't remember talking to them 
about it. I guess we just assumed that's the way it 
was. 
Tr. p. 243, 11. 3-8 
Mrs. Wright later testified that they were friends and neighbors of Harkers after the 
purchase and that Mrs. Harker lived with them for a time after Mr. Harker died. (Tr. pp. 
243,244) 
Dorsey argued at trial and on this appeal that "no such strip of land" exists and that 
the owner's certification on the Plat conveyed all title to the shores of Priest Lake in the 
Harker-Wright Deed. However, Dorsey ignores the reservation language in the Harker-
Wright deed that states Harker "reserves, as a common beach for all owners in said plat, 
that certain tract and beach lying between the mean high water line and the West Boundary 
line of Lot One." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) The Harker-Wright deed goes on to describe the 
common beach by reference to the distances found on the Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots. 
3 
The District Judge found that Harkers reserved fee title to themselves in the 
common beach and by the Deed language privately dedicated an easement on the common 
beach and road in favor of all eight (8) lots of Steamboat Bay Lots. (Tr. pp. 317-328) 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Respondents Ross, et al. filed a Complaint for Quiet Title May 26,2009, and 
Dorsey filed their Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim seeking quiet title against Ross, 
et al. and Harker on July 14,2009. (R. Vol. I, pp.11-34) 
In response to Dorsey's Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, Ross, et al. filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 17,2010. (R. Vol. I, pp.46-62). The 
gravamen of Ross, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment argument was simply that 
Dorseys held no fee title interest in the beachfront property, as it was specifically excluded 
from the initial conveyance from Harker to Wright, Dorsey's immediate predecessor in 
interest. (R. Vol. 1., pp 51-62) Ross, et al. also argued that the Dorsey's adverse 
possession claims failed to be supported by fact or law as required by Idaho case law. 
At the March 17,2010, hearing, Judge Charles Hosack found from the undisputed 
evidence in the chain of title that Dorsey had no fee simple title interest in the property, as 
it was specifically reserved in the Harker-Wright Deed. Summary Judgment was granted 
as to that issue only, reserving all other issues for trial. (R. Vol. I, pp.136-13 7). 
On May 12,2010, Dorsey filed their Motion to Set Aside, Alter, Amend and 
Reconsider Court's Order filed April 28, 2010, but never noticed the motion for hearing. 
(R. Vol. I, pp.139-144). Appellant's brief often references their Motion to Set Aside, 
4 
Alter, Amend and Reconsider, but that motion was never argued or heard by any presiding 
judge, because Appellant failed to notice it for hearing. 
When the matter first came up for trial in 2010, the trial was vacated when it was 
discovered Banner Bank and Bank: of the Cascades were necessary parties as they may 
claim an interest in the common beach under a Deed of Trust or other security instrument. 
Ross, et. al. fIled their Amended Complaint for Quiet Title on September 15,2010. (R. 
Vol. II, pp. 192-204) 
Bank of the Cascades was defaulted and Banner Bank fIled an Answer to the 
Amended Complaint on December 13,2010. (R. Vol. II, pp. 219-222) Dorsey filed an 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim on December 16,2010, seeking quiet title to the 
common beach as against Harkers and the Ross, et. al. (R. Vol. II, pp. 223-236) Banner 
Bank did not participate in the trial proceedings. The case was reset and heard by the 
Honorable Steve Verby on June 27th and 28th, 2011. 
On June 30, 2011, the Trial Court announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law stating that the totality of the circumstances arising from the Plat executed February 
17, 1966, by Mr. and Mrs. Harker and the subsequent Harker-Wright deed executed 
February 21, 1966, led to the Trial Court conclusion "[that] it was the intent of the 
Harkers to provide for roadway and beach access to all lot owners of the subdivision by 
including the language in the Owner's Certification" and reserving ownership and 
5 
dedicating the common beach in the Harker-Wright Deed. (Tr. pp.319, 11.12-17)1 
Based upon the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on 
the record on June 30, 2011, the Court entered a Judgment on July 26, 2011. (R. Vol. II, 
pp.272-276). 
Dorsey filed their Notice of Appeal August 19, 2011. (R. Vol. II, pp.277-285). 
1 In this Brief, Respondents will designate the Trial Transcript covering June 27, 28 and 
30,2010, as "Tr." and the Summary Judgment hearing on March 17,2010, as "Summary 
Judgment".) 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Appellants' Issues 
Appellants Dorsey state fourteen (14) separate "ISSUES ON A.PPEAL", and 
consume a majority of their Brief in reciting those issues and the procedural history of the 
case. 
B. Respondents' Issues 
Respondents respectfully restate that all of Appellants' Issues can be more 
succinctly restated in the following four (4) issues: 
1. Did the Trial Court correctly [md that the beach in front of Lot 1 was 
excluded from Dorseys' chain of title? 
2. Did the Trial Court correctly [md from the evidence that Harkers intended to 
dedicate the beach in front of Lot 1 as a common beach in favor of all eight 
(8) lots? 
3. As a matter of law, can a developer privately dedicate land for the benefit of 
all those members of the subdivision or plat? 
4. Are the Respondents or Appellants entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal? 
Additionally, on this Appeal Appellants seek attorneys' fees. As indicated below, 
Respondents are entitled to their attorney's fees and costs since the issues presented by 




A. Standard of Review 
Where the trial is submitted to the District Judge without jury and the evidence and 
legal issues require both findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, the standard is as follows: 
Findings of fact based on substantial and competent 
evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of 
conflicting evidence. It is the province of the District Court 
to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Beckstead v. Price, 
146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008) 
Review of a district court's [mdings of fact is limited to 
ascertaining whether the evidence supports the [mdings of fact 
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of 
law. 
Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 
136 Idaho 814, 820,41 P.3d 242, 248 (20010) 
citing Roell v. Boise City, 134 Idaho 214, 
999 P.2d 251 (2000) [citing Conley v. Whittlesey, 
133 Idaho 265, 985 P.2d 1127 (1999) 
In this case, the Appellants' Brief fails to identifY clearly whether they challenge the 
Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, though it appears on closer inspection that nearly all 
of the assignments of error raised in Appellants' Brief are challenges to the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact. 
A district court's [mdings offact in a court-tried case are 
construed liberally on appeal in favor of the judgment entered. 
It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting 
evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. If the [mdings of fact are based on substantial 
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evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be 
overturned on appeal. 
The Appellants' position can be best summarized as re-arguing the positions 
advanced at trial. No new arguments are advanced on appeal by Appellants Dorsey and 
Appellants Dorsey simply ask this Court to substitute its Judgment for the Trial Court's n 
Findings of Fact. 
B. Respondents' Restated Issues on Appeal 
1. Did the Trial Court correctly fmd that the beach in 
front of Lot 1 was excluded from Dorseys' chain of title? 
This issue seems to be the focal point of Appellants' argument. The Appellants 
spend a significant amount of time reciting the procedural history including the fact that 
District Judge Charles Hosack heard and granted Respondents' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment fmding that Dorseys have no fee title to the beach area. 
On this point, Dorseys' counsel argues that the Warranty Deed conveyed all 
ownership of Lot 1 and that the reservation language found in the Deed is "subject to" 
language constituting only a "limitation on Wrights' warranty of title". At no point does 
Dorseys' counsel explain this point or provide case law to support it. 
The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Dorseys have no fee title claim to the beach is 
well supported by the record. 
Harkers platted the eight (8) Steamboat Bay Lots in February, 1966. The Harkers 
executed the Owner's Certification on February 17, 1966, which read as follows: 
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It is the intent of the owners that Lot 1 and the 20-foot 
private road as shown on the herein Plat shall include the 
lands lying between the sidelines produced to the mean high 
water line of Priest Lake. The use of the 20-foot private road 
as shown on the herein Plat is hereby dedicated to the 
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Owner's Certification 
February 17, 1966 
The depiction of Lot 1 shows a westerly lot line which runs parallel but set back 
some twenty (20) or more feet from a line identified on the Plat as the "mean high water 
line" of Priest Lake. There appear to be dashed lines that extend the north and south lot lines 
of Lot 1 to the mean high water line of Priest Lake, but they appear distinctly different from 
the solid, bold line which delineates the western boundary of Lot 1, well short of Priest Lake. 
Appellants Dorsey contend that the language of the Plat Certificate caused Lot 1 to 
encompass all of the beachfront extending to the mean high water line. 
The inconvenient fact overlooked in Dorsey's argument is the Harker-Wright Deed 
executed four (4) days after Harkers signed the Plat Certification conveying to R.O. and 
Nitella Wright the following described property: 
Lot 1, Steamboat Bay Lots, a platted subdivision of 
Government Lot 5 in Section 27, Township 60 North, Range 
4 West, Boise Meridian. 
It is specifically understood that the grantors reserve, as a 
common beach for all owners in said plat, that certain tract 
and beach lying between the mean high water line and the 
west boundary line of said Lot 1. Said reserved beach being 
a tract approximately 20 feet wide between the waters of 
Priest Lake and the west boundary of the above-described 
10 
Lot 1, and 132.87 feet in length. 
Subject to: 1966 taxes; timber reservations of record. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 
Appellants Dorsey's contention (unsupported by any case law) that the reservation 
language is merely a "subject to" limitation on warranty of title is simply not factually 
correct. As seen in the Harker-Wright Deed, the legal description specifically excludes from 
the conveyance the beach area and dedicates it to the use of all eight (8) lots in the Plat. 
Further, the common beach description in the Harker-Wright Deed coincides perfectly (even 
to the length of 132.87 feet) to the dimensions found on the Plat of a beach area depicted as 
lying between the west boundary line of Lot 1 and the mean high water line of Priest Lake. 
(See Addendum One) 
Dorseys challenge the Trial Court's Finding of Fact that the Harker-Wright Warranty 
Deed excluded any ownership interest in the common beach area. It seems that Dorseys 
argue that the Owner's Certification on the Plat somehow precludes Harker from reserving 
title to the beach as seen in the Harker-Wright Deed four (4) days later. However, 
Appellants Dorsey provide no case law or recitation to the record for why the reservation by 
Harker should have been ignored by the Trial Court. 
Ordinarily a grantee (the Fliegels) acquires nothing more 
than the grantor (the Woods) owns and can convey. 
Gardner v. Fliegel,92 Idaho 767, 770,450 P.2d 990, 993 
(1969) [a footnote sets forth the exception for after-acquired 
title as provided for in Idaho Code § 55-605] 
II 
Harkers specifically excluded the common beach area from their conveyance to 
Wright. Thus, Wright had no title in the beach to convey to Dorsey in 1999. 
Further, the Trial Court noted from Mrs. Wright's testimony at trial "that she had 
actual notice of the language, that is the language of the reservation in the deed, and she did 
nothing about it when the Deed was recorded in 1978." (Tr. pp.320,ll.11-14) 
The Trial Court made note of this fact because Mrs. Wright never testified at trial 
that it was her belief or understanding that she had any claim of title to the beachfront, nor 
did she testifY to any efforts to secure fee title in the common beachfront despite her 
knowledge that it was reserved from her Deed on February 21, 1966. Mrs. Wright testified 
that she accepted the reservation language and "we just assumed that's the way it was". (Tr. 
p.243, 11.7-8) Mrs. Wright further testified that Mrs. Harker even occasionally stayed or 
lived with them after her husband died. (Tr. p.244, ll.22-p.245, 1.4) Presumably, if Mrs. 
Wright believed the beach was hers, she could (should) have corrected that by addressing the 
Issue. 
The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that the common beach area was reserved from the 
Dorsey chain of title is well supported by the evidence at trial including the Warranty Deed 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) and the testimony of Mrs. Wright. This Finding of Fact is based upon 
substantial and competent evidence (in fact, uncontroverted). The Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact must be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the Trial Court as [mder of fact. 
Anderson v. Larson, 136 Idaho 402, 405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001); Beckstead v. Price, 
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146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008). 
This Court should affirm District Judge Steve Yerby and District Judge Charles 
Hosack's fmdings on Summary Judgment and at Trial that Appellants Dorsey's chain of 
title does not include any fee ownership in and to the beachfront property. 
2. Did the Trial Court correctly find from the evidence that Harkers 
intended to dedicate the beach in front of Lot 1 as a common 
beach in favor of all eight (8) lots? 
Appellants Dorsey next argue that it was error for the Trial Court to have determined 
that Harkers intended to dedicate the common beach area for the use of all eight (8) lots. 
Appellants Dorsey argue as follows: (1) that there was no ambiguity in the documents and it 
was error for the Trial Court to fmd ambiguity; (2) that as a matter of law, there can be no 
private dedication of land citing Coward v. Hadley; and (3) that the District Court should not 
have found that the common beach area was an easement since it was neither pled nor 
argued. 
a. Did the Trial Court correctly find ambiguity in the 
documents? 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a 
question of law, over which this court exercises free review. 
Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous, the 
legal effect must be decided by the district court as a matter 
of law; it is only when that instrument is found to be 
ambiguous that evidence as to the meaning of that instrument 
may be submitted to the fmder of fact ..... There are two 
types of ambiguity, patent and latent. A patent ambiguity is 
an ambiguity clear from the face of the instrument in 
question .... A latent ambiguity exists when an instrument is 
clear on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the 
facts as they exist. 
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Knipe Land Company v. Robertson, 
151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 PJd 595,601 (2011) 
[citing Cool v. Mountain View Landowners 
Co-Op Ass'n., 139 Idaho 770, 772, 
86 PJd 484, 486 (2004) 
In the instant case, there are both patent and latent ambiguities found in the 
dispositive documents. 
The Steamboat Bay Plat depicts the west boundary of Lot 1 in a dark solid line, well 
short of the mean-high-water-line of Priest Lake. However, the Owner's Certification 
contains language that suggests Harkers' intended to extend the north and south lines of Lot 
1 to include all land to the mean-high-water-line.2 This is a patent ambiguity. The depiction 
on the map differs from the description in the Owner's Certification. The depiction on the 
map also depicts the beachfront area outside and westerly of the west boundary of Lot 1 with 
a dimension of 132.87 feet. 
When the Plat Map is examined in conjunction with the Harker to Wright Deed 
executed four (4) days later, it becomes clear that if, indeed, Harkers read the Owner's 
Certification on the Plat and intended to include the beachfront in their original Plat, those 
plans changed when the property was sold to Mr. and Mrs. Wright. 
The Trial Court noted that common sense dictates that the Harkers realized that all 
eight (8) lots would be more valuable and more likely to sell if all eight (8) lots shared the 
2 It is worth noting that even the Owners' Certificate contains an ambiguity in that it refers 
to sidelines "produced to the mean high water line". Harkers chose not to use the language 
"extended" to the water line. 
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common road and common beach area and that this common sense conclusion led Harkers to 
reserve the common beach area inclusive of the common beach at the end of the shared road 
as a shared or common beach for all eight (8) lots. (Tr. pp.318-320) 
Although Appellants Dorsey argue that it was error and "legally incorrect to find that 
ambiguous language could be a common law dedication", the Trial Court correctly found 
there was ambiguity on the face of the Plat (a patent ambiguity) and ambiguity in the context 
of the Plat in light of the subsequent Harker-Wright deed (a latent ambiguity). (Appellants' 
Brief, pp.37-38) 
There is ample evidence and facts to support the Trial Court's fmding of ambiguity, 
both latent and patent, in the Plat and Deed. As a matter of law, this Court should uphold the 
Trial Court's fmding that such ambiguity exists. Indeed, Appellants Dorsey have presented 
no evidence from the record to support their contention that the Trial Court erred in its 
Finding of Fact that an ambiguity exists. 
h. Private Dedication. 
Dorseys argue that Idaho law does not allow for a private dedication of land and cites 
the Court to Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282,246 P.3d 391 (2010). Dorseys contend that 
the Trial Court's fmding that Harkers reserved and dedicated the common beach area as an 
easement for the benefit of all eight (8) lots is in error, as a matter oflaw. 
Coward v. Hadley is distinguishable in that that the case was pled, argued and 
appealed as a claim of express, implied or prescriptive easement across an alley that had 
previously been expressly created in a 1922 deed until it was quitclaimed away in 1950. The 
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trial court fOlIDd against Coward in their complaint for easement by prescription, implication 
and express easement. On appeal, Coward asserted for the first time a theory that the 1922 
deed that reserved the easement impliedly created an easement in favor of both lots 2 and 11 
in a manner similar to public dedication of streets and right of way simply because the 1922 
deed referenced or used the term "alley". Coward presented no case law to support their 
theory of implied, public dedication, as none exists in Idaho. The trial court fOlIDd that there 
cannot be a public dedication to a restricted class of private individuals. To paraphrase, the 
court concluded that one cannot make a public dedication and then restrict it to a specific 
class of private individuals. It is "all or nothing" when making a public dedication. 
Dorseys now argue that Idaho law does not permit private dedication of land. Not 
surprisingly, Appellants Dorsey ignore the body of Idaho case law that directly contradicts 
their assertion. (Appellants' Brief, pp.41-43) 
"Dedication is essentially the setting aside of real property for the use or ownership 
of others." Armand v. Opporttmity Management Co., Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 714, 117 P.3d 
123, 128 (2005). 
In his ruling, District Judge Verby cited the case of Ponderosa Homesite Lot Owners 
v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006), which he described as 
"virtually identical" to the facts presented in this case. (Tr. pp.323-325, 11.13-15) The Trial 
Court also cited to Saddlehom Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 
677 (2008). 
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The elements of public and private common law dedication 
are the same, requiring (1) an offer by the owner clearly and 
unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate the land and 
(2) an acceptance of the offer. When an owner of land plats 
the lands, files the plat for record, and sells lots by reference 
to the recorded plat, a dedication of public areas indicated by 
the plat is accomplished. This doctrine protects the interest 
of purchasers who rely on the value of these public areas. 
Saddlehom Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer, 
146 Idaho 747, 751-2, 203 P.3d 677,681-2 (2008); 
quoting Ponderosa Homes Site Lot Owners 
v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc.,143 Idaho 407, 409, 
146 P.3d 673,675 (2006) 
Inexplicably, Appellants Dorsey ignore this body of case law, including Ponderosa, 
Saddlehom, and Armand, all of which acknowledge the existence of private dedication as a 
means of creating common areas for the benefit oflot owners within a specified plat. 
TIle offer to dedicate may be made in a number of ways, 
including the act of recording or filing a subdivision plat ..... 
so long as there is a clear and unequivocal indication the owner 
intends to dedicate the land .... the court must examine the 
plat, as well as the surrounding circumstances and conditions 
of the development and sale of lots. 
Armand, supra @ 714-5 
The evidence in this case is unequivocal and unambiguous that Mr. and Mrs. Harker 
(l) excluded the common beach area from the initial conveyance of Lot 1 to Wright, 
Dorseys' inlmediate predecessor; (2) Harkers then reserved that common beach area for all 
owners of said plat (the Steamboat Bay Lots) describing it as a "common beach for all 
owners" and further describing it by reference to the dimensions and distances found on the 
face of the Plat. 
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The Trial Court did not err in fmding that Harkers privately dedicated the common 
beach for the benefit of all eight (8) lots. This Court, on appeal, should sustain Judge 
Yerby's Findings and Conclusions of Law as supported by the record and evidence and aslo 
by Idaho law. 
3. Did the Trial Court err in fmding that Harker reserved fee 
ownership in the common beach area and thereby creating an 
easement for the benefit of all eight (8) lots? 
Appellants Dorsey argue that the District Court erred by finding the common beach 
area to be an easement interest in favor of all eight (8) lots. Appellants Dorsey argue that the 
easement theory was never pled by PlaintiffslRespondents in their Complaint. 
The PlaintiffslRespondents' Amended Complaint for Quiet Title filed September 15, 
2010, states as follows: 
XJV. 
Title to the Common Beach area lying between the 
mean high water line and the west body (sic) of Lot 1, was 
reserved by the Defendants Harker for the benefit of all eight 
(8) Steamboat Bay lots as owners in common or co-tenancy. 
On information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the 
Defendants Harker, are deceased. 
(R.Vol. II, p.l97) 
The Amended Complaint goes on to state that there is a cloud on title as to the 
parties' right, title and ownership interest in the common beach area created by the 
ambiguities of the deeds of conveyance (specifically, the Harker-Wright deed, and the Plat). 
The Amended Complaint seeks declaratory judgment pursuant to Idaho Code Title 12, 
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Chapter 10, to determine the rights and interests in the common beach area and further asks 
the Court to enter a quiet title judgment as to the common beach area finding that the 
common beach area is an appurtenant interest or ownership of all eight (8) Steamboat Bay 
Lots. (R. Vol. II, pp.198-200) 
In response, Appellants Dorsey filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on 
December 16, 2010, stating that the Plaintiffs have no standing, no appurtenant ownership 
and no "ownership of a dominant estate".3 (R. Vol. II, pp.224) The Appellants Dorsey's 
Counterclaim further seeks quiet title through reformation of the deed to omit or remove the 
language contained in the Harker-Wright Deed reserving and dedicating the common beach 
area. (R. Vol. II, pp.233) 
At trial, Appellants Dorsey presented no evidence to support their reformation claim. 
In fact, their witness, Mrs. Wright, testified that she knew of the reservation and accepted it 
as being "the way it was". (Tr. p.243, 11.7-8) 
The Appellants Dorsey also counterclaimed for quiet title based upon adverse 
possession and seeks a quiet title decree against the Plaintiffs! Appellants and against the 
F.M. Harker Estate and Gladys L. Harker Estate.4 
Idaho Code § 10-1201 empowers courts of record acting within their jurisdictions to 
"declare the rights, status and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be 
3 The dominant estate referenced by Dorsey clearly implies their understanding that quiet 
title and declaratory relief may well encompass the Court's determination of easement 
rights. 
4 Appellants Dorsey appear not to have served the Harker Estates and abandoned their 
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claimed". I.e. § 10-1201 (2012) 
Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code Title 
10, Chapter 12, bestows the authority to declare rights, status 
or other legal relations, that authority is circumscribed by the 
rule that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a 
case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists". 
Generally, justiciability questions are divisible into several 
subcategories: advisory opinions, feigned and collusive 
cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions and 
administrative questions. 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 
133 P.3d 1232-1237 (2006) 
Dorseys do not raise any issue as to whether a judiciable controversy exists. There is 
no evidence in the record to support any of the categories to justiciability questions set forth 
in Schneider above, and there clearly is a real and present controversy between Appellants 
and Respondents concerning the right, title, status or other legal relations of the parties in 
respect to the common beach area. 
As the Declaratory Judgment Act was cited and pled in PlaintiffslRespondents' 
Amended Complaint, Dorseys' argument that the Court erred by granting an easement, 
because no easement claim was pled, is not supported by this record. 
The merits of the District Court's reasoning in fmding an easement bares careful 
examination. 
claims of quiet title against Harker to the common beach area. 
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4. As a matter of law, can a developer privately dedicate land for 
the benefit of all those members of the subdivision or plat? 
The record reflects that Harker held title to all of the ground described in the Plat. 
In the Harker-Wright Deed, Harkers state their intention as follows: 
It is specifically understood that the grantors reserve, as a 
common beach for all owners in said Plat, that certain tract 
and beach lying between the mean high water line and the 
west boundary line of said Lot 1 ..... 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 
The Court found that Harkers never conveyed fee ownership of the common beach 
area after the reservation in the Deed. The Court concluded that fee ownership in the 
common beach still resides in Harker, subject to the "common beach" language contained in 
the Harker-Wright Deed. There is no evidence that the Court erred in its Findings of Fact 
and the Appellants Dorsey have failed to present this Court with any authority to overturn 
Judge Yerby's decision. 
Additionally, Judge Yerby correctly analyzed the case law starting with Ponderosa 
Homesite Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, as well as Deffenbaugh v. Washington Water 
Power, 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247 (1913). Also, Judge Yerby noted that the Saddlehorn 
Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer states as follows: 
Under Idaho law, a dedication, whether express or common 
law, creates an easement. Moreover, an easement does not 
divest the servient estate owner of title ..... nor does the 
creation of an easement divest the servient estate owner of 
the ability to transfer title. 
Tr. pp. 326,11. 18-23; quoting 
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Saddlehorn Ranch Landowners, Inc. v. Dyer 
146 Idaho 747, 752, 20dP.3d 677, 682 (2009) 
The Trial Court correctly stated the law of Idaho thereby finding that Harkers 
reserved title to themselves in the cornmon beach area and dedicated the cornmon beach area 
to the use of all eight (8) lots. As a matter of law, this created an easement in favor of all 
eight (8) lot owners.5 
The Appellants Dorsey have shown no error in the Trial Court's decision to follow 
Idaho law, as set forth in Ponderosa Homesite, Saddlehorn Ranch, and other recent cases 
determining that private dedication results in an easement interest. Further, Appellants 
Dorsey are simply wrong in their assertion that this relief was not pled, since the Amended 
Complaint and even Dorsey's Amended Answer, addresses the relief sought under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act and Quiet Title Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's Findings 
and award Respondents their attorney's fees and costs. 
5. Are the Respondents or Appellants entitled to attorneys' fees on 
appeal? 
a. Appellants' request for attorney's fees. 
Appellants simply site several basis for seeking fees, but do not support it with 
5 It should be noted that even if Appellants Dorsey had presented evidence that the 
beachfront area had been conveyed by Harker to Wright or Dorsey, that such a conveyance 
in fee ownership would not have divested the remaining seven (7) lots from their easement 
interest created by the dedication language found in the Harker-Wright deed. In other 
words, even if Dorsey had shown that they had acquired fee title ownership to the cornmon 
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argument. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 provides procedure for awarding attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal, but does not provide an authority to award attorney's fees. Capps v. FIA 
Card Services, N.A, 149 Idaho 737, 744,240 P.3d 583, 590 (2010). 
Citation to Idaho Code § 12-121 is in and of itself insufficient authority for the award 
of attorney's fees on appeal. Capps v. FIA Card Services, N.A ,149 Idaho 737, 745, 240 
P.3d 583, 591 (2010). 
Citation to Rule 54( e )(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure also does not provide 
a legal authority for the award of attorney's fees on appeal. Capps, supra 744. 
Appellants Dorsey argue they are entitled to attorney's fees based upon Idaho Code § 
12-121, LR.C.P. 54(e )(1) and LAR. 41, but cite no other legal authority and provides no 
argument for the award of attorney's fees. Appellants Dorsey appear to argue a statute of 
limitations argument under Idaho Code §5-203 and a statute of frauds argument under Idaho 
Code § 9-503, neither of which were asserted at the trial level, and neither of which form a 
legal basis or authority for the award of attorney's fees. 
Simply put, Appellants Dorsey have failed to cite the Court to any authority or 
argument for an award of attorney's fees. Pursuant to the Capps decision, Appellants 
Dorsey's claim for attorney's fees must be denied. 
b. Respondents are entitled to attorney's fees. 
Respondents Ross, et aL seek attorney's fees underIdaho Code § 12-121, LR.C.P. 
54( e)(1) and LAR. 41. 
beach area, the result still would have been the same . 
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Where an appeal has been pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation, 
the prevailing the party is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Beus v. Beus, 151 
Idaho 235,242,254 P.3d 1231, 1238 (2011). 
"An award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to 1. C. § 12-121 is proper only 
where this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 'brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation"'. Electrical Wholesale Supply Company, 
Inc., v. Nielsen, 136 Idaho 814, 828, 41 P.3d 242,256 (2001); quoting Stanley v. McDaniel, 
134 Idaho 630, 7 P.3d 1107 (2000). 
In the instant case, the Appellants Dorsey have simply requested this Court to 
overturn the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without citation to any 
portions of the record in which the Court misconstrued the evidence. 
Further, Appellants Dorsey have asked this Court to ignore well settled, well 
established Idaho law on the issues of private dedication cited by the Trial Court in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without any argument why this Court should set 
aside well settled Idaho law. 
"Where an appeal turns on questions of law, an award of attorney's fees under this 
section is proper if the law is well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing 
that the district court misapplied the law." Electrical Wholesale, supra at 828. 
Where an appellant's arguments on appeal only ask "this court to second guess the 
trial court's determinations based on conflicting evidence presented during trial", it is 
appropriate to award attorney's fees and costs against the appellant for having brought the 
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appeal frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Benninger v. Derifield, 145 Idaho 373,376-7, 179 P.3d 336,340-1 (2008). 
In this appeal, Appellants Dorsey have done nothing but ask this Court to second 
guess the appropriateness of the decisions of the Trial Judges, Steve Yerby and Charles 
Hosack. Appellants Dorsey's arguments are essentially a challenge to the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without citation to the record of conflicting 
evidence or case law, statute or authority to reverse the Trial Court's Judgment. 
F or the reasons set forth above, the Respondents Ross, et al. are entitled to and seek 
an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
25 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Respondents ask this Court to affIrm the Judgment 
of the Trial Court and to award Respondents their attorney's fees and costs. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2012. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CH~7? 
Attorney for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of October, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Gary A. Finney, Esq. 
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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